




Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Américas
Justice Studies Center of the Americas

INDICATORS FOR EVALUATING THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN THE AMERICAS



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San Pío X 2460, Office 608, Providencia, Santiago, Chile

Tel.: +(56 9) 5611 2162

www.cejamericas.org

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Introduction

This book by the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (CEJA) is published at a particularly challenging time for the democracies and justice systems in the hemisphere. In a context marked by political polarization, economic uncertainty, the proliferation of disinformation and an up-tick in different forms of violence, one of the most vulnerable pillars of the rule of law is judicial independence.

Democracy, understood as the separation of government powers, requires not only regulatory and conceptual guarantees, but also empirical and verifiable ones. Under this premise, the international standards that enshrine the independence of Judges and prosecutors must be translated into concrete conditions that ensure their effective application in daily practice.

The independence of Judges and prosecutors is essential to guarantee impartial justice. Its protection constitutes a political-institutional responsibility that falls on the highest authorities of the branches of government. This obligation must be translated into regulatory frameworks, public policies and operational mechanisms aimed at preventing and neutralizing any form of interference, whether external or internal. In the most critical scenarios, these pressures distort the development of the judicial and prosecutorial career, compromising the principles of merit, objectivity and transparency.

Justice institutions are exposed to political tensions on an ongoing basis. Recognizing this reality is the starting point for promoting effective strategies to protect independence. In this context, it is essential that the judiciary and public prosecutor's offices design and implement specific measures to identify, limit and control such influences, as well as strengthen their capacities to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into their structures.

In Latin America, the threats faced by Judges and prosecutors take multiple forms and have different levels of severity. They range from political pressure, smear campaigns and unfounded disciplinary sanctions to hierarchical interference and physical aggression. These situations have been documented by civil society organizations, international agencies and by justice operators themselves.

In 2023, CEJA published the study “The Independence of Justice Operators in the Americas: Regional Situation and Challenges Related to Defending Democracy.” The study is based on empirical evidence and offers a regional assessment of these risks. This research showed the need to move from assessment to the development of practical tools to evaluate, monitor and strengthen judicial and prosecutorial independence.

This book is CEJA's second specialized contribution on judicial independence. Its main value lies in translating international standards -such as those developed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct and the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors- into a set of operational indicators that are empirically verifiable and can be adapted to the institutional realities of Latin America and the Caribbean.

This book presents a set of 57 technical indicators designed to assess the state of independence of Judges and prosecutors in the region. The indicators identify risk factors both external and internal to the institutions and are accompanied by a practical methodological guide for analysis, prevention and institutional intervention.

One of the main contributions of this publication is its comprehensive approach. The indicators not only facilitate the identification of overt and obvious violations, but also make it possible to detect more subtle, gradual or covert violations that can progressively erode independence. Furthermore, the discussion presented in this book is not limited to judges. Rather, it explicitly includes prosecutors, recognizing their strategic role in the fight against organized crime and corruption and the unique pressures and threats they face.

Another distinctive element of this publication is the organization of the indicators into analytical *Categories* and *Dimensions*, which serve to address the various forms, manifestations and causes of impairment of independence, whether institutional or personal. It also includes indicators to measure both good and practices and desirable standards. This part of the book is aimed at strengthening institutional capacities and promoting a culture of independence.

That practical approach is reflected in the measurement methodology, which combines quantitative and qualitative information, relying on a wide range of sources ranging from judicial records and administrative resolutions to observatory reports, verifiable complaints, normative analysis and qualitative interviews. This range of sources facilitates a more complete, cross-sectional and rigorous evaluation.

We hope that this publication will serve as a practical tool that can be used to strengthen the independence of Judges and prosecutors in the region. Our goal is to offer a technical tool to evaluate the institutional context, identify risks, activate alerts and guide public policies aimed at guaranteeing verifiable conditions of judicial independence. The proposed indicators are designed to support monitoring, analysis and follow-up by various State and non-State actors committed to defending the independence of Judges and prosecutors, facilitating the generation of evidence, the promotion of institutional improvements and the strengthening of the rule of law in the Americas.

We conclude this introduction by reaffirming the firm commitment of the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (CEJA) to the development of technical tools that contribute to the improvement of justice systems in Latin America and the Caribbean. On this occasion, we do so through a set of indicators designed to identify progress, setbacks and best practices, promoting reforms that recognize judicial independence as one of the essential pillars of democracy in the hemisphere.

Nataly Ponce Chauca
Executive Director
Justice Studies Center of the Americas (CEJA)

Chapter I: Technical and Methodological Framework

I.1. General Objective

To contribute to the technical and comparative evaluation of the independence of Judges and prosecutors in the Americas using indicators that identify critical threats and risks, institutional challenges and best practices for their prevention and mitigation.

I.2. Specific Objectives

- To propose a set of technical, practical and verifiable indicators for the evaluation of judicial independence in the region.
- To identify the main regulatory, institutional and contextual factors that impact the independence of Judges and prosecutors in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- To promote self-evaluation processes and institutional assessments that serve as a basis for making decisions aimed at strengthening the independence of Judges and prosecutors.
- To contribute to the design of evidence-based judicial reforms and public policies aimed at guaranteeing the independence of Judges and prosecutors in the Americas.

I.3. Target Audience and Application

The indicators contained in this publication are designed to be used by a variety of actors, both institutional and individual, who are interested in evaluating, monitoring and strengthening the independence of Judges and prosecutors in the Americas. These include, among others:

- **Magistrates, Judges and prosecutors** in their jurisdictional or administrative functions, as a tool for reflection and continuous improvement of their work.
- **Judiciaries, public prosecutor's offices and judiciary councils** as a basis for institutional assessments, strategic planning and formulation of internal policies.
- **Judges' and prosecutors' professional organizations** as a tool for the defense of judicial and prosecutorial independence, the identification of risks and the promotion of institutional standards in their respective institutions.
- **International organizations and international cooperation agencies** as a tool for the design, implementation and follow-up of programs designed to strengthen the rule of law and judicial independence, both nationally and regionally.
- **Civil society organizations** as a technical tool for citizen monitoring, accountability and promotion of reforms aimed at strengthening the independence of Judges and prosecutors.
- **Academic institutions, research centers and universities** for purposes of analysis, comparative study and production of empirical knowledge on judicial independence.

I.4. Sources

The design of the indicators proposed in this material is based on an exhaustive review of the following documents, among others:

- *Regional Report: "Independence of Justice Operators in the Americas: Regional Situation and Challenges for Democratic Defense"* (CEJA, 2023)
- *Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary* (United Nations, 1985)
- *Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct* (UN, 2006)
- *Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors* (UN, 1990)
- *Declaration on the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Prosecutors* (International Association of Prosecutors, 1999)

I.5. Categories and Dimensions of Independence of Judges and Prosecutors

In the interests of offering a structured and coherent framework that facilitates their proper application, the indicators contained in this publication are organized into three Categories and six Dimensions. All of them are designed to facilitate an in-depth and comparative assessment of the various factors that affect the independence of Judges and prosecutors.

Categories

Categories constitute analytical axes that group dimensions with shared characteristics. These categories are not mutually exclusive but are articulated in a complementary manner to provide a comprehensive view. To facilitate their identification and analysis, each indicator has been coded according to the corresponding category. The following table presents the Categories that structure and guide the set of indicators contained in this instrument.

Table 1. Categories of Independence of Judges and prosecutors

No.	Category	Description
Category 1	Origin	<i>Refers to the origin of threats, risks or factors that affect the independence of Judges and prosecutors, whether from within the institutions of justice or from external actors.</i>
Category 2	Nature	<i>Refers to the intrinsic characteristic of each factor identified, specifying whether it is a regulatory, political, institutional, economic or other type of element.</i>
Category 3	Object	<i>Refers to the specific component of the independence of Judges and prosecutors on which the threat, risk or factor falls, such as the judicial career or the judicial function.</i>

Developed by the authors. CEJA, 2025.

Dimensions

The Dimensions constitute the specific units of analysis of the independence of Judges and prosecutors in their different manifestations. Each Dimension represents a substantive and differentiable component that can be evaluated by means of indicators. They are grouped into Categories based on shared characteristics.

The following table presents the Dimensions that guide the set of indicators.

Table 2. Dimensions of the Independence of Judges and Prosecutors

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>External Independence</i>	<i>This refers to pressure, interference or threats from actors outside the judicial system, such as the executive and legislative branches, the media, economic groups or corruption networks.</i>
<i>Internal Independence</i>	<i>Refers to pressures or obstacles arising from within the judicial or prosecutorial system itself, including hierarchical authorities, judicial governance bodies or dysfunctional institutional practices.</i>
<i>Regulatory Independence</i>	<i>This refers to the existence of constitutional, legal or regulatory rules that guarantee the functional and structural autonomy of Judges and prosecutors.</i>
<i>De facto Independence</i>	<i>This refers to the effective and autonomous exercise of judicial or prosecutorial functions beyond what is provided for by law, without undue interference.</i>
<i>Institutional Independence</i>	<i>This refers to structural and organizational factors that affect independence, such as selection systems, sanctions, institutional security, data protection, cybersecurity or inter-institutional cooperation.</i>
<i>Personal Independence</i>	<i>This refers to the individual factors that allow each judge or prosecutor to act independently or hinder their efforts to do so, such as stability in the position, professional training, protection against personal attacks or gender focus.</i>

Developed by the authors. CEJA, 2025.

The following table presents the organization of the indicators in the Categories and Dimensions.

Table 3. Indicators by Category and Dimension

<i>Code</i>	<i>Category and Dimension</i>	<i>Operators</i>	<i>No. of Indicators</i>
<i>By Origin</i>			
<i>E</i>	▸ <i>External influence</i>	<i>Judges and prosecutors</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>I</i>	▸ <i>Internal influence</i>	<i>Judges and prosecutors</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>By Nature</i>			
<i>NJ</i>	▸ <i>Regulatory independence</i>	<i>Judges</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>NF</i>	▸ <i>Regulatory independence</i>	<i>Prosecutors</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>FJ</i>	▸ <i>De facto independence</i>	<i>Judges</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>FF</i>	▸ <i>De facto independence</i>	<i>Prosecutors</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>By Object</i>			
<i>P</i>	▸ <i>Personal independence</i>	<i>Judges and prosecutors</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>IT</i>	▸ <i>Institutional independence</i>	<i>Judges and prosecutors</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Total</i>			<i>57</i>

Developed by the authors. Based on data gathered by the authors, CEJA, 2025.

I.6. Suggested Frequency for the Application of Indicators

The table below presents the suggested frequency for the application of the indicators based on the nature of the phenomenon to be measured and the context in which they are applied.

Table 4. Suggested Frequency of Application of the Indicators

<i>Purpose of the Indicator</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Suggested Frequency</i>
<i>Preventive Management</i>	<i>Evaluates institutional capabilities, identifies weaknesses and guides improvement plans.</i>	<i>Protection protocols, training plans, existence of institutional policies, etc.</i>	<i>Biannual</i>
<i>Structural surveillance</i>	<i>Monitors slowly evolving regulatory, structural or public policy factors.</i>	<i>Regulations on independence, access to positions, gender policies, etc.</i>	<i>Annual</i>
<i>Critical risk</i>	<i>Identifies situations with the potential to seriously and immediately affect the independence of Judges and prosecutors.</i>	<i>Arbitrary removals, retaliation, threats and significant interference</i>	<i>Semiannual</i>

Developed by the authors. Based on data gathered by the authors, CEJA, 2025.

Chapter II: Indicators for Evaluating the Independence of Judges and prosecutors

II.1. Indicators by Origin Category

II.1.1 External Influence Indicators

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
E1	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Smear campaigns in the media or on social media	Smear campaigns in traditional media or digital platforms against judges or prosecutors who have been involved in cases of high public impact.	<p>Qualitative: Presence or absence of smear campaigns against judges or prosecutors, with verifiable public scope (e.g., repeated content with the intention of damaging reputation, without objective support).</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of documented smear campaigns against judges or prosecutors based on their participation in high public impact cases during a given period.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media monitoring (press, television, radio) • Analysis of social media and digital platforms • Official complaints filed by the affected persons or by their institutions • Reports prepared by judges' and prosecutors' professional associations • Documents from media observatories, human rights organizations or civil society entities • Institutional records of disciplinary bodies and ombuds' offices.

E2	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Selective justice in favor of powerful groups	Preferential treatment or quick resolution of cases involving politicians or companies with power, without legal justification or transparency.	<p>Qualitative: Presence or absence of documented cases evidencing privileged judicial or fiscal treatment in favor of individuals with political or economic power without clear legal grounds or transparency criteria.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of cases identified in which stakeholders with de facto power have been granted preferential treatment or expedited resolution without objective justification.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Court records and rulings issued • Reports on justice observatories or judicial transparency • Comparative analysis of processing times in similar cases • Media reports • Duly substantiated technical or academic opinions • Verifiable public complaints made by unions, civil society organizations or oversight entities.
E3	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	External pressures in admission, selection or promotion processes for judges or prosecutors.	Pressure exerted by actors external to the judicial or prosecutorial structures who seek to unduly influence the admission, selection or promotion of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of external pressures or interference that affect the transparency of the selection and appointment of judges or prosecutors.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of documented cases of irregularities associated with external influence in judicial or prosecutorial competitions or appointments.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from judicial observatories or oversight organizations • Institutional audits • Administrative decisions related to selection processes • News reports or journalistic investigations • Complaints filed by applicants, officials or judicial unions.
E4	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Removal due to undue outside interference	Removal of judges or prosecutors due to interference by external agents or institutions without just cause or outside the cases provided for by law.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of dismissals of judges or prosecutors linked to interference by external agents or institutions without justified legal cause or procedure in accordance with the regulations in force.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of documented cases of dismissal</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rulings of dismissal issued by competent bodies • Reports from institutional oversight bodies • Official statements from justice system institutions • Reports from international organizations on judicial independence

					due to external interference outside the established legal assumptions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verifiable complaints filed by civil society organizations or associations of Judges and prosecutors
E5	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Influence of corruption	Judges or prosecutors who have received or requested economic or other benefits to facilitate judicial rulings or influence judicial decisions.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of complaints, investigations or testimonies indicating that judges or prosecutors have received or requested undue benefits in exchange for altering judicial decisions.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of documented cases in which judges or prosecutors have been linked to acts of corruption that compromise their impartiality.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final sentences for corruption offenses • Reports from public prosecutors' offices, attorney generals' offices or comptrollers' offices • Reports from international organizations on judicial integrity • Complaints documented by judicial observatories • Verifiable journalistic research published in reliable media outlets
E6	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Manipulation of criminal law against judges or prosecutors	Criminal law is used to punish judges or prosecutors, especially in cases that could involve power players in various spaces.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of patterns or repeated cases in which criminal law has been used as a form of institutional pressure or retaliation against judges or prosecutors because of the content of their decisions.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of judges or prosecutors criminally investigated for their work in contexts where an objective and proportional criminal case is not identified.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Court records of criminal proceedings brought against judges or prosecutors • Reports from national and international human rights organizations • Statements by judicial or prosecutorial associations • Interviews with affected justice operators or experts in the field • Pattern analysis through databases of baseless criminal complaints

E7	External influence	Judges or Prosecutors	Instructions to judges or prosecutors in sensitive cases	Pressure from external agents through calls to or instructions issued for judges or prosecutors to influence their performance in politically sensitive cases.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of complaints, statements or testimonies indicating that attempts have been made to exert external interference through direct instructions in the processing of sensitive cases.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of politically sensitive cases with documented evidence of external interference in the actions of judges or prosecutors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from judicial or prosecutorial observatories • Interviews with justice operators or experts on the system • Reports or investigations conducted by reliable media outlets • Institutional records of complaints or anomalous communications • Statements by judges' associations, prosecutors or human rights organizations
E8	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Legislative pressure	Bills or laws that directly or indirectly affect the independence of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the content of legislative initiatives, enacted laws or parliamentary speeches that may affect the functional, structural or personal independence of judges or prosecutors.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of legislative initiatives filed or laws approved that contain provisions that could limit, impact or undermine the independence of judges or prosecutors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official record of legislative bills and enacted laws • Comparative regulatory analysis • Congressional debates and proceedings • Reports from judicial bodies or professional associations • Reports from international organizations that work on the independence of judges or prosecutors • Technical opinions from academic institutions or specialized research centers
E9	External influence	Judges and prosecutors	Political trials or pre-trial hearings	Political authorities who have initiated political trials or pre-trial hearings against judges	<p>Qualitative: Analysis of the motivations for and legal grounds and political context of impeachment or removal processes with a focus on possible improper uses of the</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports and legislative records on impeachment or pre-impeachment proceedings • Minutes and resolutions of the corresponding committees

				<p>or prosecutors with the purpose of pressuring and influencing their decisions, or to remove them from office.</p>	<p>mechanism as a form of pressure or retaliation.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of prosecutions or removal proceedings brought against judges or prosecutors during a given period related to their work on sensitive or high-impact cases.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliable media coverage • Statements by judicial, prosecutorial or civil society organizations • Institutional decisions related to the admission or archiving of processes • Reports of international organizations on judicial independence
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II.1.2 Internal Influence Indicators

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
I1	Internal influence	Judges and prosecutors	Internal pressures in the processes of admission, selection or promotion of judges or prosecutors.	Pressure exerted by internal actors within the judicial or prosecutorial structures who unduly seek to influence competitions for the admission, selection or promotion of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of patterns of internal interference, favoritism or undue interference in the selection, appointment or promotion of judges or prosecutors.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of appointments, promotions or designations with institutional observations, public remarks or that were made without public competition or objective criteria.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from judicial or prosecutorial observatories • Administrative resolutions issued by selection bodies • Internal audits or institutional oversight reports • Duly documented public or trade union complaints • Reliable news reports or independent research
I2	Internal influence	Judges and prosecutors	Removal for improper internal interference	Dismissal of judges or prosecutors for interference by hierarchical superiors within the institution without just cause or outside the cases provided for in the legislation.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of testimonies, documents or records evidencing undue pressure exerted by hierarchical superiors to promote the removal of judges or prosecutors, outside the established procedures.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of dismissals or decisions reversed due to internal instructions of a hierarchical nature outside the legal framework and without objective basis.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with affected justice operators or key witnesses • Internal audits or institutional disciplinary oversight reports • Reports or statements from judicial and prosecutorial associations or professional organizations • Administrative records of disciplinary proceedings • Documentation submitted on appeal or review

13	Internal influence	Judges and prosecutors	Transparency and objectivity of case assignment systems	Case assignment systems allow for objective and transparent distribution of cases and prevent manipulative conduct that could limit the independence of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the regulatory design, technical criteria and operational performance of the case assignment system, paying special attention to possible areas of use of discretion or unjustified manual intervention.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of cases reassigned without technical justification outside of the automated system or through discretionary decisions not provided for in the regulations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal or external audits of the case assignment system • Technical reports from the judicial or fiscal management areas • Complaints documented by justice operators or professional associations • Administrative rulings related to irregular reassignments • Statistical analysis of distribution of cases by court or prosecutor's office
14	Internal Influence	Judges and prosecutors	Instructions to judges or prosecutors in sensitive cases	Mechanisms exercised by the hierarchical levels of the judicial or prosecutorial systems to unduly influence the performance or decisions of judges or prosecutors in politically sensitive cases.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of guidelines, verbal or written instructions, institutional pressures or other unjustified mechanisms through which attempts are made to influence the criteria of judges or prosecutors in the processing or resolution of sensitive cases.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of complaints, investigations or administrative or disciplinary proceedings initiated due to hierarchical interference in jurisdictional or prosecutorial decisions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with affected justice operators or key witnesses • Reports from ethics committees, disciplinary bodies or internal oversight mechanisms • Disciplinary or administrative rulings documenting interference • Formal complaints filed with institutional authorities • Reports from international organizations or professional associations
15	Internal Influence	Judges and prosecutors	Implementation of Anti-corruption Policies	Policies, programs or strategies to prevent, identify and punish corruption in the judicial	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the effectiveness, scope and coverage of the measures implemented to prevent, identify and punish acts of</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic plans or institutional documents • Compliance reports and internal or external audits

				or prosecutorial institution.	<p>corruption within the judicial or prosecutorial structures</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of anti-corruption policies, programs, protocols or specific mechanisms in place during the reporting period.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluations carried out by national or international organizations • Reports from anti-corruption agencies or comptrollers' offices • Policy documents, regulations and operating protocols
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II.2. Nature Category Indicators

II.2.1. Regulatory Independence of Judges

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
NJ1	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Regulatory recognition of judicial independence	The Constitution or laws expressly protect judicial independence.	<p>Qualitative: Explicit presence of the principle of judicial independence in the Constitution, organic laws of the judiciary or other rules regulating the judicial function.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of legal provisions that recognize, develop or guarantee judicial independence in the national legal system.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Constitution • Organic laws of the Judiciary • Comparative regulatory analysis • National or international legislative databases • Legal reports from specialized agencies
NJ2	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Merit-based and transparent processes for the admission, selection and promotion of judges.	The rules regulate requirements and procedures for the admission, selection or promotion of judges based on meritocracy, technical-objective and objective evaluation and transparency.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of rules that establish public competitions based on merit, with technical criteria and objective, transparent and verifiable procedures for admission, selection and promotion in the judicial career.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of regulatory provisions that pertain to selection and promotion</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Judicial career laws • Regulations and manuals for competitions or selection processes • Internal regulations on the government of the judiciary • Reports from oversight, auditing or accountability bodies

					processes with explicit criteria of transparency, objectivity and technical evaluation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External evaluations or technical reports on selection processes
NJ3	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Tenure judges of	The regulations recognize the right of judges to hold office without being arbitrarily removed before the end of the corresponding term.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of constitutional, legal or regulatory standards that prohibit the arbitrary removal of judges and establish guarantees for stability in office.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of legal provisions that expressly regulate the conditions, grounds and procedures for the removal of judges in accordance with the principles of legality and due process.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Constitution • Organic laws of the Judiciary • Judicial career statutes or regulations • Constitutional or superior court case law • Legal reports from specialized or institutional oversight bodies

NJ4	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Security and protection of judges	The regulations guarantee security and protection measures for judges, especially for those who work on cases of serious corruption or organized crime.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of regulatory provisions that establish personal, family and institutional protection mechanisms for judges who are at risk because of their knowledge of cases related to corruption or organized crime.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of specific laws and other rules regulating security measures and protection protocols for judges in high-risk contexts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Laws on protection of justice operators • Institutional protocols for judicial security • Complementary criminal or criminal procedure regulations • Internal judiciary regulations • Reports from agencies specializing in judicial protection and security
NJ5	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Judges' compensation, pensions and retirement benefits	The regulations establish guarantees of adequate compensation, pensions and retirement benefits for judges.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of provisions that regulate special or differentiated pension and retirement systems for judges aimed at protecting their independence and ensuring decent working and living conditions during and after their term of service.</p> <p>Quantitative: Comparison of the pension and salary system of judges with that of other public functions equivalent in hierarchy and responsibility.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pension or social security law • Special judiciary or judicial career regulations • Official budget comparisons • Reports from the social security system or fiscal oversight agencies • Technical studies on the sustainability and equity of the judicial pension system

NJ6	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Prohibition against removal of judges	The regulations establish that judges may not be transferred, suspended or dismissed except in the cases provided for by law and through formally established procedures.	<p>Qualitative: The existence of regulatory provisions that ensure that judges remain in their roles until their retirement or the completion of the term for which they were appointed, except for legal reasons and in accordance with duly regulated procedures.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of regulations that establish guarantees of job stability, limiting arbitrary removal, transfer or suspension.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Constitution • Organic laws of the Judiciary • Judicial career regulations • Constitutional or superior court case law • Disciplinary regulations and procedure manuals
NJ7	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Suspension or removal of judges	The regulations provide that procedures for the suspension or removal of judges must be based exclusively on objective grounds, such as supervening incapacity or duly proven disqualifying conduct.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of rules limiting the suspension or removal of judges to grounds expressly set forth in the law related to incapacity to hold office or conduct incompatible with the judicial function.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of judges suspended or removed from office in accordance with established procedures and based on the grounds set forth in the regulations in force.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Constitution • Disciplinary laws or statutes of the judicial career • Institutional resolutions regarding suspension or separation • Reports from oversight bodies or disciplinary commissions • Related constitutional case law
NJ8	Regulatory Independence	Judges	Independent reviews of disciplinary proceedings	The regulations provide for independent reviews of disciplinary proceedings, suspensions or dismissals of	<p>Qualitative: Existence of rules guaranteeing the right to an impartial and independent review of decisions adopted in</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disciplinary regulations applicable to the judiciary • Administrative or judicial case law on review of sanctions

				judges, except for exceptions clearly defined by law.	disciplinary proceedings, including suspensions or dismissals, except in expressly exempted cases. Quantitative: Number of disciplinary decisions that have been subject to review by independent oversight, appellate or supervisory bodies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional reports of disciplinary oversight bodies • External monitoring reports or reports from international organizations • Rulings of appellate bodies or constitutional courts
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II.2.2. Regulatory Independence of Prosecutors

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
NF1	Regulatory Independence	Prosecutors	Security and protection of prosecutors	The regulations set forth physical and personal security measures for prosecutors, especially for those who prosecute cases of serious corruption or organized crime.	Qualitative: Existence of rules to ensure the protection and personal, family or institutional security of prosecutors in situations of risk derived from the performance of their duties. Quantitative: Number of standards regulating personal and occupational safety mechanisms for prosecutors in high-risk contexts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prosecutor protection laws • Specific regulations of the public prosecutor's office • Institutional security protocols for prosecutors • Reports from the public prosecutor's office or oversight bodies • Reports on implementation and monitoring of protective measures

NF2	Regulatory Independence	Prosecutors	Selection of prosecutors on the basis of merit and transparency	The requirements and procedures for the admission, selection or promotion of prosecutors based on merit and a technical-objective and transparent evaluation.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of rules that establish public competitions and merit-based procedures with technical, objective and transparent criteria for admission, selection and promotion in the prosecutorial career.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of regulatory provisions that govern selection and promotion processes with explicit criteria of transparency, objectivity and technical evaluation in the field of criminal prosecution.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prosecutorial or public prosecutor's office career laws • Regulations and manuals for competitions or selection processes • Internal rules of the governing body of the public prosecutor's office • Reports from oversight, auditing or accountability bodies • External evaluations or technical reports on prosecutor selection processes
NF3	Regulatory Independence	Prosecutors	Basic conditions for the work of prosecutors	The regulations set out the basic conditions necessary for prosecutors to perform their work.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of a legal system that guarantees minimum conditions for the exercise of the prosecutorial function, including adequate compensation, job stability, regulated working hours, social benefits and decent working conditions.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of provisions regulating fundamental aspects of the criminal prosecution service, such as compensation, stability, benefits, social protection and material working conditions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic laws of the public prosecutor's office • Budgetary regulations and official pay scales • Internal regulations of the public prosecutor's office or of the prosecutorial career • Reports from institutional oversight or evaluation bodies • Comparative studies on working conditions in the justice sector

NF4	Regulatory Independence	Prosecutors	Transparency, consistency and legality in the intervention of other authorities	The regulations establish that the authorities outside the public prosecutor's office that have the legal power to initiate, authorize or stop criminal proceedings must exercise such power in a non-arbitrary and uniform manner and in accordance with the principle of equality before the law.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of rules that clearly and restrictively regulate the participation of authorities outside the public prosecutor's office in regard to decisions on the initiation, suspension or termination of prosecutorial proceedings, ensuring that they are subject to principles of legality, objectivity and equality.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of regulations establishing specific procedures, controls and limits for the exercise of such powers by external authorities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic laws of the public prosecutor's office • Criminal procedure codes • Relevant constitutional and criminal case law • Internal regulations and operating manuals of the public prosecutor's office • Institutional reports from the public prosecutor's office or oversight agencies
NF5	Regulatory Independence	Prosecutors	Prosecutorial decisions	The regulations establish that when prosecutors exercise discretionary powers in criminal investigation or prosecution, their decisions must be subject to clear regulatory frameworks and previously defined institutional guidelines.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of regulatory and institutional criteria that guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, ensuring consistency, legality, objectivity and equity in decision making.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of regulations, guidelines or protocols that govern and delimit the exercise of discretionary powers by prosecutors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic laws of the public prosecutor's office • Internal manuals or protocols on prosecutorial work • Institutional resolutions establishing guiding criteria • Criminal or constitutional case law related to the principle of legality and control of discretionary power • Doctrinal analysis or reports from supervisory bodies
NF6	Regulatory Independence	Prosecutors	General instructions	The general and specific instructions issued within the public prosecutor's offices are compatible with legal norms	<p>Qualitative: Existence of regulatory provisions that establish limits, conditions and control mechanisms for the issuance of general</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizational regulations of the public prosecutor's office • Institutional resolutions or internal guidelines

				and are subject to guidelines that safeguard the independence of prosecutors.	<p>or specific instructions by hierarchical authorities in order to avoid undue interference in prosecutorial work.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of rules that formally regulate the issuance, content, form and scope of instructions within the public prosecutor's office in order to safeguard the functional autonomy of prosecutors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulations or manuals on the work of prosecutors • Internal legal reports or reports from oversight bodies • Case law regarding the autonomy of the public prosecutor's office
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II.2.3. De facto Independence of Judges

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
FJ1	De facto Independence	Judges	External practices of respect for the role of judges	Verification that government institutions and the private sector refrain from exerting undue pressure and effectively and verifiably respect the independence of judges.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the institutional behavior of public officials and private actors in relation to respect for judicial independence, including the absence of statements, acts or practices that may constitute undue pressure or interference.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of actions, institutional statements or decisions that have been identified as reinforcing or</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from international and regional organizations • Surveys of judges and justice system operators • Reports from non-governmental organizations specializing in justice or human rights • Constitutional case law or Supreme Court decisions • Institutional monitoring and media analysis

					violating judicial independence during a given period.	
FJ2	De facto Independence	Judges	Perception of independence	Judges believe that they can perform their duties autonomously and free from external or internal pressure.	<p>Qualitative: Degree of perception of autonomy in judicial decision making in accordance with relevant laws.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of documented cases of interference in the judicial function or formal complaints about lack of autonomy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional surveys of judges and justice operators • Qualitative interviews with judges • Reports from judicial observatories or civil society organizations • Reports from international organizations on judicial independence • Administrative records of complaints or disciplinary procedures associated with undue pressure
FJ3	De facto Independence	Judges	Effective application of merit-based, technical and transparent criteria for judicial admission and promotion.	Verification that the procedures for the admission, selection and promotion of judges are based on merit, technical-objective evaluation and transparency.	<p>Qualitative: Degree of objectivity of the judicial selection and promotion processes based on the existence of clear rules, impartial commissions and public evaluation criteria.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of public competitions held with publication of terms and conditions, evaluation criteria, results and challenge mechanisms available.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Results of competitions and selection proceedings • Official publications of calls and results • Observation reports by external organizations or civil society • Internal rules and regulations of the judicial government body • Institutional audits or evaluations of selection processes
FJ4	De facto Independence	Judges	Working conditions	Verification that judges receive adequate compensation and have safe working conditions that are compatible with the	<p>Qualitative: Judges' perception and institutional evaluation of the existence of decent working conditions, including physical</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salary scales and budgetary regulations of the judicial system • Institutional surveys of judges and judicial operators

				nature and demands of their work.	security, reasonable workload, infrastructure and work environment. Quantitative: Salary comparison with equivalent public roles, job stability indicators and number or type of employment benefits formally granted.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labor regulations applicable to the judiciary • Reports on working conditions prepared by judicial management or supervisory agencies • Regional technical or comparative studies on labor conditions in the justice system
FJ5	De facto Independence	Judges	Immobility	Judges may not be removed prior to their retirement or the end of their legally established term.	Qualitative: Evidence of practical stability in the exercise of judicial powers without transfers, suspensions or removals that are arbitrary or issued outside of established legal assumptions. Quantitative: Number of removals of judges carried out without just cause or outside of the regulatory procedures in force during a given period.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from disciplinary or administrative oversight bodies • Institutional decisions of the judiciary related to dismissals or removals • Constitutional or contentious-administrative case law • Cases documented by judicial associations, observatories, or reliable media outlets • Internal judicial career records
FJ6	De facto Independence	Judges	Impartiality in investigations of judges	Verification of respect for due process in investigations of or disciplinary or judicial proceedings against judges.	Qualitative: Institutional or union perception of the existence of guarantees of impartiality, legality and the right to defense in disciplinary or judicial proceedings involving judges. Quantitative: Number of decisions vacated or overturned by higher instances due to due process violations in proceedings against judges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional or administrative case law on procedural nullities • Reports from judicial defense bodies, public prosecutors' offices or public defender's offices • Institutional or trade union reports on due process • Records of disciplinary proceedings vacated or revised • Observation of international or civil society organizations

FJ7	De facto Independence	Judges	Suspension or removal from office	Verification that the suspension or removal of judges is based solely on legally established grounds, such as supervening incapacity or duly accredited disqualifying conduct.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of an institutional practice that guarantees the exclusive application of justified grounds for the suspension or removal of judges in accordance with the principles of legality, proportionality and due process.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of cases of suspension or removal in which it is verified that the cause invoked is legally supported and documented in the official disciplinary records.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disciplinary records of the judiciary or judicial governing body • Reports from internal oversight bodies or ethics committees • Institutional decisions to suspend or remove judges • Relevant case law on legality of disciplinary sanctions • Reports from judicial observatories or professional associations
FJ8	De facto Independence	Judges	Application of disciplinary procedures	Verification that disciplinary sanctions, including suspensions or dismissals of judges, are applied in accordance with the law, with objective criteria and established procedures and guarantees.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of institutional practices that ensure consistency, legality and proportionality in the application of disciplinary sanctions.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of disciplinary decisions reviewed, modified or vacated due to lack of grounds, inconsistent application of the law or procedural violations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal audit or disciplinary oversight body reports • Decisions issued by review bodies or higher instances • Administrative or constitutional case law • Institutional or professional association reports on disciplinary sanctions
FJ9	De facto Independence	Judges	Independent review of disciplinary decisions	Verification of the existence and performance of independent review mechanisms for decisions adopted in disciplinary	<p>Qualitative: The existence of impartial and independent bodies responsible for reviewing disciplinary decisions with</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administrative or constitutional case law • Decisions of higher courts or review bodies

				<p>proceedings, including suspensions and dismissals of judges.</p>	<p>the capacity to vacate, modify or confirm such decisions.</p> <p>Quantitative: Percentage of disciplinary decisions reviewed by independent review bodies and proportion of these that were modified or reversed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from external oversight or supervisory bodies • Institutional statistics on disciplinary appeals
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II.2.4. De facto Independence of Prosecutors

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
FF1	De facto Independence	Prosecutors	External practices respecting the role of prosecutors	Verification that government institutions and the private sector refrain from exerting undue pressure and effectively and verifiably respect the independence of prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the institutional behavior of public officials and private actors in relation to respect for the independence of prosecutors, including the absence of statements, acts or practices that may constitute undue pressure or interference.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of acts, institutional statements or decisions that have been identified as reinforcing or infringing on prosecutors' independence during a given period.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from international organizations and human rights mechanisms • Surveys of prosecutors and criminal justice system operators • Reports of civil society organizations or judicial observatories • Constitutional or criminal case law • Institutional records and professional association statements
FF2	De facto Independence	Prosecutors	Perception of independence	Prosecutors perceive that they can exercise their functions autonomously, free from external or internal pressures.	<p>Qualitative: Degree of perception of prosecutors' autonomy in decision-making in accordance with the corresponding laws.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of documented cases of interference in the prosecutorial function or formal complaints about lack of autonomy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional surveys addressed to prosecutors and justice operators • Qualitative interviews with prosecutors • Reports published by observatories of public prosecutor's offices or civil society organizations • Reports from international organizations on prosecutorial independence • Administrative records of complaints or disciplinary

						procedures associated with undue pressures
FF3	De facto Independence	Prosecutors	Effective application of merit-based, technical and transparent criteria in the recruitment and promotion of prosecutors.	It is possible to verify that the procedures for the admission, selection or promotion of prosecutors are based on meritocracy criteria, technical-objective evaluations and transparent processes.	<p>Qualitative: Degree of objectivity of the selection and promotion processes for prosecutors, considering the existence of clear rules, impartial commissions and public evaluation criteria.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of public selection processes held with publication of terms and conditions, evaluation criteria, results, and challenge mechanisms available.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcomes of competitions and selection proceedings • Official publications of calls and results • Observation reports by external organizations or civil society • Internal rules and regulations of the prosecutorial governance body • Institutional audits or evaluations of selection processes
FF4	De facto Independence	Prosecutors	Security measures for prosecutors	Verification of the existence of physical and personal security measures to protect prosecutors in the performance of their duties, especially those investigating organized crime and cases of serious or complex corruption.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of effective physical and personal safety conditions in workspaces and during work hours.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of prosecutors with active protective measures; number of assaults, threats or risk incidents recorded.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional reports from the public prosecutor's office • Official records of protection measures activated • Documented complaints to oversight bodies or security entities • Reports from specialized international organizations • Statements made by prosecutors' professional associations • Internal audits in the area of institutional security • Current regulations on the protection of justice operators

FF5	De facto Independence	Prosecutors	Working conditions	Verification that prosecutors receive appropriate compensation and perform their duties in appropriate work environments.	<p>Qualitative: Institutional perception of the effective application of conditions of service, stability and compensation.</p> <p>Quantitative: Percentage of prosecutors with job stability, access to benefits and compensation that aligns with the regulatory framework.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official salary scales of the public prosecutor's office • Budgetary and spending records • Administrative decisions on working conditions • Institutional human resources reports • Internal surveys or work climate studies • Statements made by professional associations • Reports from oversight or inspection agencies
FF6	De facto Independence	Prosecutors	Application of discretionary powers and alternative approaches	Verification that prosecutors exercise discretionary powers and use alternative approaches under the rules and institutional policies and without political or other types of influence.	<p>Qualitative: Degree of practical autonomy in the application of the principle of opportunity.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of decisions adopted under this principle without observations of interference.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prosecution files that apply the principle of opportunity • Internal reports from the public prosecutor's office on the use of alternative approaches • Administrative resolutions and institutional guidelines • Interviews or surveys of prosecutors • Reports from judicial or civil society observatories • Reports from oversight or supervisory bodies • Statements by prosecutors' associations or professional associations

II.3. Object Category Indicators

II.3.1. Personal Independence

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
P1	Personal independence	Judges and prosecutors	Provisional appointments of prosecutors or judges	Some prosecutors or judges have provisional status rather than a permanent appointment.	Qualitative: Presence of judges or prosecutors who are performing their duties in a provisional capacity. Quantitative: Percentage of judges or prosecutors in provisional status with respect to the total number of existing positions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional records of the judiciary and public prosecutor's office • Administrative appointment decisions • Reports from institutional oversight or auditing bodies • Judicial observatory reports • Reports or statements by judges' or prosecutors' professional organizations or associations • Official judicial academy or judiciary council statistics
P2	Personal independence	Judges and prosecutors	Use of promotions and transfers to influence the independence of judges or prosecutors	Verification of the existence of transfers or promotions of judges or prosecutors used as mechanisms of pressure or retaliation with the purpose of influencing their performance or affecting their independence.	Qualitative: Existence of documented cases of politically motivated, disciplinary or retaliatory transfers or promotions. Quantitative: Number of transfers or promotions questioned, reversed or annulled due to undue interference.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer or promotion decisions issued by administrative agencies • Institutional or oversight body reports • Statements by judicial or prosecutorial professional associations • Formal complaints filed by affected judges or prosecutors • Constitutional or superior court case law • Reports from judicial observatories or international missions

P3	Personal independence	Judges and prosecutors	Removal and disciplinary sanctions	Verification of the use of disciplinary procedures or removal from office as mechanisms that threaten the independence and the guarantee of irremovability of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of documented cases in which sanctions or removals were applied for pressure purposes or without legal justification.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of disciplinary or removal procedures applied without legal grounds or due process.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional disciplinary records • Reports from ethics committees or judiciary councils • Administrative or constitutional case law • Statements by international organizations • Complaints documented by professional or civil society organizations
P4	Personal independence	Judges and prosecutors	Psychological preparation	Verification that the initial and ongoing training processes for prosecutors or judges incorporate psychological preparation content and tools for managing stress, institutional pressure and exposure to highly emotional situations.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the degree of incorporation of psychological preparation and stress management modules in training and professional development programs.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number or percentage of training programs that include content on mental health, institutional resilience and emotional stress management.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Judicial and prosecutorial school curricula • Initial and continuing education curricula and syllabi • Institutional training and welfare programs • Training program evaluation reports
P5	Personal independence	Judges and prosecutors	Gender Perspective	The processes for the appointment and promotion of prosecutors and judges promote and guarantee gender parity in access to positions.	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the existence and application of institutional policies that promote parity and the incorporation of the gender perspective in selection and promotion processes.</p> <p>Quantitative: Proportion of women appointed or promoted to judicial or</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional gender reports • Official statistics disaggregated by sex • Reports on competitions and appointments • Equality and non-discrimination policy documents • Records of gender equity offices or Equality Commissions

					prosecutorial positions out of the total number of selected individuals.	
P6	Personal independence	Judges and prosecutors	Serious violence against prosecutors or judges	Verification of the existence of documented cases of serious violence against prosecutors or judges, including murders, attacks or attempted assaults.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of records, complaints or testimonies regarding acts of serious violence -such as attacks, threats or murders- directed against judges or prosecutors in the performance of their duties.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of judges or prosecutors killed, injured or attacked as a direct result of their work.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports from the judiciary or public prosecutor's office • Official institutional security records • Complaints filed with judges' or prosecutors' professional associations • Reports from international human rights organizations • Coverage and documentation in reliable media outlets • Official statistics on violence against judges or prosecutors

II.3.2. Institutional Independence

Code	Dimension	Applicable Operator	Indicator Name	Technical Description	Unit of Measurement	Verification Source
IT1	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Objective criteria for the personal interview stage	Verification that the personal interview stage in the selection processes for judges or prosecutors is governed by objective criteria, standardized methodologies and mechanisms that	<p>Qualitative: Evaluation of the existence and effective application of clear criteria, aligned guidelines and standardized tools in the interview stage, as well as mechanisms to mitigate the amount of discretion that can be used.</p> <p>Quantitative:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minutes and records of personal interviews • Institutional evaluation protocols and interview guides • Observation reports from external organizations or ombuds' offices • Internal audits on selection processes • Resolutions of challenges or appeals due to flaws in interviews

				prevent arbitrary or discretionary assessments.	Number of complaints, observations or institutional recommendations related to arbitrary ratings or lack of justification in the evaluation of interviews.	
IT2	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Data Protection Policies	Verification that the institution has updated policies and effective mechanisms for the protection of personal data of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence and effective application of current institutional policies on personal data protection in line with national and international standards.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of incidents or breaches of personal data reported and documented annually.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal data protection policies and protocols • Information security audit reports • Disciplinary or administrative rulings related to data leakage or misuse of data • National regulations on personal data protection • Reports from supervisory bodies or data protection authorities
IT3	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Cybersecurity	Verification that the institutional information systems have computer security protocols that ensure restricted, controlled and secure access to the information of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence of active protocols and institutional mechanisms to prevent, identify and record attempts at unauthorized access or violations of computer systems.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of cybersecurity incidents managed annually through institutional response, mitigation and control procedures in accordance with established standards.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Computer security technical reports • Internal or external audits on information systems • Institutional cybersecurity protocols and policies • Internal complaints or inquiries about unauthorized access • Incident reports from the technology area or units responsible for digital security.
IT4	Institutional Independence	Judges and prosecutors	Institutional Cooperation	Verification of the existence of active cooperation	<p>Qualitative: Existence and evaluation of formal mechanisms for active inter-</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inter-institutional agreements signed to strengthen the security of prosecutors or judges

				mechanisms between the justice system, security forces and intelligence agencies to prevent and respond to threats or attacks against judges or prosecutors.	institutional cooperation in the protection of justice operators. Quantitative: Number of agreements in force, protocols implemented or joint actions carried out between judicial institutions, security forces and intelligence agencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational protocols for inter-institutional coordination to protect the security of judges or prosecutors • Joint implementation reports • Intelligence reports • Institutional statistics on collaboration or results in risk cases
IT5	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Risk Analysis	Periodic risk analyses are conducted to identify high-risk judges or prosecutors based on the nature of the cases they hear.	Qualitative: Existence and effective application of institutional protocols or standardized methodologies for the periodic evaluation of risks faced by judges or prosecutors. Quantitative: Number of risk analyses performed annually for judges or prosecutors according to the type of cases assigned.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional security plans • Risk analysis protocols • Official risk assessment records • Annual risk reports issued • Institutional protection policies
IT6	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Security Protocols	Verification of the implementation of differentiated protection protocols for judges or prosecutors exposed to high risks due to the nature of the cases they hear.	Qualitative: Existence and effective application of specific protection protocols for judges or prosecutors identified as being at high risk. Quantitative: Number of judges or prosecutors with active special protection measures according to their level of risk.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official safety protocols • Institutional records on the application of protective measures • Relevant administrative resolutions • Internal statistics of the public prosecutor's office or judiciary • Risk assessment reports and protection plans

IT7	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Protocol for institutional responses to disinformation campaigns	Verification of the existence of an institutional protocol for an agile response to disinformation campaigns that threaten the institutional or personal integrity of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence and application of specific institutional strategies for the identification, containment and denial of disinformation campaigns against judges or prosecutors.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of official denials issued; average institutional response time to documented cases of misinformation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional communications protocols • Official or public statements • Media and social media monitoring records • Reports from press offices or communications units
IT8	Institutional independence	Judges and prosecutors	Training programs to protect the independence of Judges and prosecutors	Verification of the existence of training programs aimed at strengthening and protecting the independence of judges or prosecutors.	<p>Qualitative: Existence and content of specific training programs on the independence of judges or prosecutors.</p> <p>Quantitative: Number of training activities carried out and judges or prosecutors trained annually.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Records of judicial and prosecutorial training institutions • Annual reports from judicial academies or the public prosecutor's office • Institutional training plans • Impact or follow-up evaluations of training programs

Project Team

Project design and management:

Nataly Ponce Chauca

Authors:

Nataly Ponce Chauca and Juan Farfán Mallma

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